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Abstract
Negotiating with suppliers and with customers is a key
part of supply chain management. However, with recent
technological advances, the mechanisms available to carry
out such activities have become increasingly sophisticated,
and the environment in which these activities take place
has become highly dynamic. As a consequence, the overall
planning of these complex trades, and the coordination of
the various component activities, need to be carefully con-
sidered. In this setting, it is crucial that the intended be-
haviour, and through that, the desired outcomes, of these
composite trading activities be expressed in a suitably pre-
cise manner. Using an approach based on the generation of
negotiation plans, this paper describes (i) an approach to
the specification of such complex activities, and (ii) a cor-
responding execution model. The proposal is illustrated and
validated by means of a scenario taken from a recent trad-
ing agent competition.
Keywords: supply chain management, trading activities,
negotiation protocols, negotiation plans
1 Introduction
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) [14] is an inter-
national forum designed to promote and encourage high
quality research into the trading agent problem. The sup-
ply chain management game for the trading agent compe-
tition (TAC SCM) has been designed jointly by a team of
researchers from the e-Supply Chain Management Lab at
Carnegie Mellon University and the Swedish Institute of
Computer Science (SICS) [2]. The first TAC SCM com-
petition was held in 2003 [10].
Major activities involved in a typical supply chain man-
agement scenario include planning and coordination of
tasks such as securing raw materials, manufacturing, stor-
ing, negotiating, receiving customers orders, and delivering
products. Traditional supply chains are fixed and depend on
long-term relationships among key trading partners. TAC
SCM was designed to provide a test-bed for the researchers
in their investigation of the issues associated with managing
a supply chain in a dynamic environment.
Specification of composite trading activities has been
proposed in [12, 13]. In this paper, we specify composite
trading activities from the TAC SCM scenario based on a
forward-looking trading framework [11]. Forward-looking
trading is based on the generation of negotiation plans de-
tailing the exact time and duration for which trading ac-
tivities are going to be executed. These plans are gener-
ated based on the histories of previous negotiations and fu-
ture negotiation opportunities. In forward-looking trading,
a planning and execution model is designed to maximise
the expected utility of the trader. Forward-looking trading
is suitable for situations in which a well-planned negotiation
process is possible.
A brief introduction to the TAC SCM is given in section
2. The forward-looking framework is described in section 3.
The approach to specifying composite trading activities is
detailed in section 4. In section 5 we briefly review related
work before summarizing our ideas in section 6.
2 Game overview
Six agents compete in each TAC SCM game [2]. Each
game is played for 220 simulated days and each day being
15 seconds long. Each day, agents compete in two mar-
kets (supplier side and customer side) in order to maintain
their inventory level to build and sell different types of PCs.
In a TAC SCM game, 16 types of PCs can be built from
four component types: CPUs, motherboards, memories,
and hard drives. Each PC type is defined with its constituent
components, the number of assembly cycles required and
the market segment (low range, mid range, high range) they
belong to. Each component type has two suppliers from
the computer hardware manufacturing industry. The suppli-
ers are Pintel for Pintel CPUs, IMD for IMD CPUs, Basus
and Macrostar for motherboards, MEC and Queenmax for
memories, and Watergate and Mintor for disks. There are
eight suppliers in total. The total number of customers is
undefined and they are treated as a single entity.
Suppliers: Each day an agent is allowed to send a max-
imum of ten Request For Quotes (RFQs) to each supplier.
Selection of an RFQ by a supplier depends on the priority
of the agent which is calculated based on the ratio of the
number of RFQs and the actual orders. If the supplier can
satisfy the order specified in the RFQ in its entirety, an offer
is sent as a response. If the supplier cannot supply the entire
quantity requested in the RFQ by the requested due date, the
supplier will respond by issuing up to two amended offers,
each of which relaxes one of the two parameters — quantity
and due date. More information on the TAC SCM game can
be found in [2]. All offers made by suppliers are valid for
a day and hence require the agent, if interested, to send a
confirmation by issuing a purchase order.
Customers: Customers request PCs of different types to
be delivered by a certain due date by issuing RFQs to the
agents each day. Agents must bid to satisfy the entire or-
der (both quantity and due date) specified in an RFQ. The
customer selects the bid with the lowest price (which is less
than or equal to the reserve price specified in the RFQ) as
the winning bid and the winner will be notified at the start
of the next day.
Agents: Each day, agents issue RFQs to the suppliers.
The next day, the suppliers reply to the agents with offers
based on their availabilities. Agents then select from these
offers (based on the quantities, delivery dates, and prices)
and reply to the supplier within the same day.
Each day, customers issue requests for quotes of dif-
ferent types of assembled personal computers (PCs) to the
agents and, within the same day, the agents reply with of-
fers. Customers then select the best offer based on delivery
dates and prices and, reply to the agents on the next day.
At the start of each day, each agent receives RFQs for
PCs from the customers, and orders won by the agent in re-
sponse to offers sent to the customers the day before. Also,
each agent receives offers for the components in response
to the RFQs that the agent had sent to the suppliers the day
before.
Each agent is endowed with a PC factory which is ca-
pable of assembling any type of PC, and an inventory stor-
ing both components and finished PCs. Each day, the agent
sends a production schedule to the factory for the produc-
tion on the next day. The agent also sends a delivery sched-
ule which will cause deliveries to the customer the next day.
The supplies (components) can be used for production on
the next day after the delivery and PCs are not allowed to
be shipped on the day of their production.
Agents have accounts in the bank and start the game with
no money in the accounts. A fixed interest rate is charged if
the balance is in debt or credited if the balance is positive.
The storage cost for both finished goods and components
is chosen randomly from a predefined range at the start of
the game and revealed to all the agents. At the end of the
game, the agent with the highest sum of money in the bank
is declared as the winner.
3 Forward-looking trading
In this paper, we analyse the specification and execution
of composite trading activities based on the probability of
an offer leading to a deal. The forward looking framework
allows trading activities to be scheduled at an exact time
point and allows replanning of its activities when new op-
portunities are available.
3.1 Trading activities
An elementary trading activity (ETA) is defined as a set
of tasks required for the purpose of reaching a trading agree-
ment with a specific trading partner based on a given ne-
gotiation protocol. An ETA is described by the following
attributes: the action (e.g. buy or sell), the description of
the item (e.g. name and number of units), the description of
the trading partner, the negotiation protocol employed, and
the temporal constraints involved. An example of an ETA
from the financial trading domain is: “Negotiate with seller
A to buy 2000 units of BHP for at most $10 using a bargain-
ing protocol. The trade should be executed before 12:00PM
13-Nov-2004 and after 10:00AM 13-Nov-2004.”
A composite trading activity (CTA) may comprise one
or more (elementary or composite) trading activities. For
instance, a buy-sell CTA may include two ETAs, one for
buying and one for selling. There are important types of re-
lationships among two interrelated trading activities, com-
plementary and alternative. Two trading activities are com-
plementary [7] when both of them have to be successful or
neither should them succeed. Two trading activities are in
an alternative (also known as substitutive [7]) relationship
when only one of the activities should be successful or nei-
ther of them should succeed.
The proposed model for specifying composite trading
activities is based on a construct [Min..Max], informally de-
fined as follows: given a number of concurrent trading ac-
tivities, at least Min activities and at most Max activities are
to be successful or none of them should succeed. To illus-
trate its application, the composite trading activities from a
paper mill scenario are depicted in Figure 1. The purchasing
department of a paper mill is planning to buy recycled fibre
and hydrogen peroxide according to the following plan:
• buy 500 tons of recycled fibre from seller S1 or S2, and
• buy 300 gallons of hydrogen peroxide from seller S3
or S4.
The hydrogen peroxide is used for bleaching recycled fibre
to produce pulp. The purchasing department is determined
not to transact if any of the purchases is unsuccessful. This
example suggests that a composite trading activity (CTA)
can be viewed as a composition of elementary trading ac-
tivities (ETAs) and other CTAs as shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Nested trading activity with [M..N]
construct
ETAs within the same CTA can in principle be executed
concurrently. However, there are occasions during the nego-
tiation when the ETAs need to be “synchronised” so that a
global decision is taken. For example, in Figure 1, ETAs (D)
and (E) need to be synchronised to make sure that only one
of them will be successful. ETAs (F) and (G) also need to be
synchronised. In addition, both buying activities, which are
depicted as CTAs (B) and (C), need to be synchronised so
that both of them will be successful or neither will. These
observations suggest a model where trading activities are
represented as trees in which the leaves denote ETAs and
the nodes denote CTAs which are instantiations of synchro-
nisation constructs.
3.2 Certainty vs. contingency
In order to schedule trading activities using negotiation
plans, we define a dynamic property called certainty which
can be used to categorise these trading activities based on
their likelihood of achieving a successful negotiation. A
trading activity is said to be secure when it has received a
(binding) proposal from the trading partner. A trading ac-
tivity is said to be contingent when it is planning to send a
(binding) proposal to the trading partner. A secure trading
activity is guaranteed of achieving a deal if it sends an ac-
ceptance message to the trading partner, while a contingent
activity has no means of guaranteeing that it can achieve a
deal. An example of a secure ETA is one that has received
a quote from a fixed-price seller with unlimited supply. The
ETA is guaranteed to make a deal if it sends an acceptance
message. On the other hand, an ETA in charge of bidding in
an English auction is contingent for the duration of the auc-
tion, since it is able to send a proposal (bid) to the auction-
eer, but it cannot guarantee that this bid will lead to a deal.
To illustrate the derivation of the secure/contingent prop-
erty and its relation to the internal workings of the ETAs,
a buyer trading activity with alternating offers bargaining
(AOB) protocol [6] is taken as an example.
Example, a buyer ETA using an AOB protocol: In the
alternative offers bargaining protocol, a trading activity may
switch between certainty properties during the negotiation:
an ETA may be in a situation in which a deal can be guaran-
teed due to the receipt of an offer, or in a situation in which a
counter-offer has to be made (since the offer from the trad-
ing partner is unacceptable) and therefore the ETA is not
certain of making a deal. These two situations are depicted
in Figure 2.
Suppose that the ETA has received an offer from the trad-
ing partner. If the offer is acceptable (considering the limit
price), the ETA is considered as secure until the offer from
the trading partner expires. This situation is depicted in Fig-
ure 2(a). If the offer from the trading partner is unacceptable
and if the ETA has decided to make a counter-offer, the ETA
is considered as contingent until the offer from the trading
partner expires. This situation is depicted in Figure 2(b). In
this case, the turnaround time is equal to the expiry duration
of the counter-offer made by the ETA.
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Figure 2. Turnaround time for negotiating with
AOB protocol
3.3 Valid plans
The selection, by an internal node, of which of its child
nodes should negotiate is guided by a negotiation plan. This
plan contains information about the child nodes and the time
points at which negotiations are scheduled to be performed.
To improve the chance of success, the total number of child
nodes scheduled in a negotiation plan may exceed the maxi-
mum requirement. In order to avoid the total number of suc-
cessful child nodes exceeding the maximum requirement,
an execution engine [11] is assigned to every internal node.
This engine monitors and controls the execution of the plan
for that node. The engine is able to decide which child
nodes are to be executed at the next time point, based on
the status of the tasks executed so far. In addition, the en-
gine will always maximise the number of successful child
nodes whenever possible.
Accordingly, we define the concept of a possible negoti-
ation plan (or negotiation plan for short), as follows.
Definition 3.1. (Possible Negotiation Plan). A possi-
ble negotiation plan P of an internal node N is a set
of tuples consisting of trading activities and time points
{(c1, start1, end1), .., (cn, startn, endn)}, where starti
and endi are the start time and end time of a predefined ac-
tivity (e.g. bid or accept proposal) of child node ci. A child
node ci can only be scheduled once in the plan. The activity
associated with the child node ci must be executed at most
once during starti and endi, and it takes at least one time
instance to complete (i.e. starti 6= endi). In addition, the
execution must start at starti and the result of the execution
will be known before endi.
Definition 3.2. (Valid Negotiation Plan). A possible nego-
tiation plan P of an internal node N , P ⊆ N.Children ×
T × T ,1 is said to be a valid plan, written validPlan(N,P )
if and only if:
1. The duration of the trading activity falls within the
trading activity time constraints.
2. In order to avoid the number of successful trading ac-
tivities exceeding the maximum requirement, the total
number of secure trading activities in the plan must be
less than or equal to Max.
3. The total number of secure trading activities in the plan
must be at least Min− 1 if there are no secure trading
activities scheduled at the beginning of the plan, and at
least Min otherwise.
4. At any time, the total number of potentially successful
trading activities within a valid plan must not exceed
the upper bound imposed by Max.
Since several valid plans may exist for an internal node, a
prioritisation scheme is needed to select the best plan avail-
able. Due to the limited space, we summarise the prioritisa-
tion scheme as follows:
Expected utility: We define the expected utility of an
agent as the product of the probability of winning the auc-
tion with a bid b and the profit obtained from b. Several
outcomes are possible when a valid plan is executed. The
expected utility of a valid plan depends on the probability
of each potential outcome and its estimated profit.
There can be more than one way to achieve a valid out-
come. For instance, if more than one trading activity is
1N.Children denotes the set of child nodes of N and T denotes the
set of all time points.
scheduled at the same time, the execution engine may need
to make a choice to avoid exceeding the maximum require-
ment. Different choices made by the engine can lead to dif-
ferent ways of achieving an outcome. An execution trace is
one of the possible ways to achieve an outcome by selective
execution of the trading activities which are scheduled in a
valid plan. The probability of a valid outcome is the sum
of the probability of all execution traces which can produce
that outcome.
The next step in the calculation of expected utility is to
estimate the profit of an outcome. An outcome may com-
prise several trading activities. The profit of a valid outcome
is the sum of the profits of all its trading activities.
Leaf node: The estimated profit of a leaf node (ETA) de-
pends on the limit price, the transaction cost, and the ne-
gotiation price. The limit price of a leaf node is set by the
trader prior to the negotiation. Its value is static throughout
the negotiation unless it is modified by the user. The limit
price of a selling leaf node indicates the minimum amount
the user is expected to gain whereas the limit price of a buy-
ing leaf node indicates the maximum amount that the user
is willing to spend.
Transaction cost is one of the important issues in any
trading situation. For instance, in financial trading, trans-
action costs imposed by the brokers and exchanges pose a
significant overhead to both buyers and sellers. A transac-
tion cost can be a fixed amount or may depend on the price
of the items to be traded. In our model, we assume that
every leaf node has estimates of transaction costs.
The negotiation price is the actual price that a leaf node
will bid (or propose) to the trading partner. The negotiation
price of a selling leaf node is positive and the negotiation
price of a buying leaf node is negative.
The profit of a leaf node indicates how attractive the ne-
gotiation price is. The profit returns a positive value when
the negotiation price is higher than the limit price for a sell-
ing action, or the negotiation price is lower than the limit
price for a buying action. The profit of a leaf node is nega-
tive when the negotiation price is lower than the limit price
for a selling action or the negotiation price is higher than the
limit price for a buying action. A positive profit represents
a desirable position whereas a negative profit represents an
undesirable position. The profit also takes into account the
transaction cost.
Internal node: After the plans are generated at an internal
node, a plan with the maximum expected utility is selected
and designated for execution. In addition, the internal node
will derive its own properties based on that plan. The prob-
ability of an internal node is equivalent to the sum of the
probabilities of the valid outcomes which can result from
the execution of the maximum expected utility plan. The
estimated profit of an internal node is equivalent to the util-
ity of the maximum expected utility plan of node divided by
the probability of that node.
A lower bound valid outcome is a valid outcome which is
only able to achieve the minimum number of required suc-
cessful negotiations Min. For instance, let {A,B}, {C,D},
{A,B,C}, {A,C,D}, and {A,B,C,D} be the valid outcomes
of a internal node N , which is constrained by the synchro-
nisation construct [2..3], the lower bound valid outcomes of
N are {A,B} and {C,D} since their cardinality is equal to
2 (Min = 2). The limit price of an internal node repre-
sents either the minimum amount the node is expecting to
gain, or the maximum amount the node is willing to spend,
to achieve the minimum number of required successful ne-
gotiations. Therefore, the limit price of an internal node is
equivalent to the sum of the limit prices of the nodes of an
outcome which is the minimum among all available lower
bound valid outcomes.
An internal node N is said to be secure at the start time
of a maximum utility plan of N if it has at least min(N)
secure child nodes. An internal node N is said to be contin-
gent at the start time of a maximum utility plan ofN if it has
min(N)− 1 secure child nodes. The turnaround time of an
internal node N is equivalent to the duration of a maximum
expected utility plan of N .
3.4 Generation and execution of negotiation plans
Before any negotiation plans can be generated, the user
is required to construct the trading model based on the in-
formation of available trading partners (e.g. auctions), the
number of successful trading activities required, and the
time constraints. The limit price for each ETA (leaf node)
is also set by the user. All nodes within the model are also
assigned with a unique identifier. Due to the tree-structured
configuration, every member of the model is required to be
coordinated in a systematic way so that execution of the
plans does not violate the predefined constraints. The gen-
eral outline of the overall approach is described as follows:
1. Once the specification of the model has been com-
pleted, the user issues the initialise instruction to
the root which is then propagated downward until it
reaches the ETAs.
2. Each ETA then reports to its parent the limit
price, certainty property (accompanied by the expiry),
turnaround time, and the probability function for cal-
culating expected utility.
3. Based on the information provided by its child nodes,
a parent node generates valid negotiation plans and se-
lects a plan with the maximum expected utility. The
parent node then records the plan for future execution.
4. Based on the maximum expected utility plan, an in-
ternal node derives its own properties (limit price, cer-
tainty, turnaround time, the estimated profit, and the
probability). These properties are then reported to its
parent node.
5. Step 3 and 4 are repeated until the properties are de-
rived at the root and the maximum expected utility
plans are recorded at every internal node.
6. If the user agrees on the limit price (at the root) which
indicates the total amount that the user is expected to
spend/gain with respect to the maximum expected util-
ity plan, a negotiate instruction is issued to the root au-
thorising the execution of the plan.
7. Once an internal node (or the root) receives a negotiate
message from its parent, it retrieves the recorded max-
imum expected utility plan and sends negotiate mes-
sages to the child nodes within the plan which have
their start times equal to the current time.
8. Step 7 is repeated at all internal nodes until a negoti-
ate message arrives at the ETAs (leaf nodes). Once an
ETA receives a negotiate message from its parent, it
executes its predefined task (submit a bid or accept an
offer) and waits for the result from the trading partner.
Upon receiving the result from the trading partner, the
ETA reports its status (result) to its parent node.
9. Based on the result of the executed child nodes, an in-
ternal node may decide to stop or continue the exe-
cution of the plan. An internal node also constantly
determines its own status (successful, failed, or ended)
and reports it to its parent node.
10. Step 9 is repeated until the root node is reached and the
root node informs the user whether the overall execu-
tion has succeeded or failed. Based on the result, the
user may decide to end the negotiation or to renegoti-
ate with new constraints. In the latter case, an initialise
message is issued to the root and the whole process
(from steps 1 to 9) will be repeated.
To illustrate the specification of composite trading activ-
ities and generation of negotiation plans, we have extracted
the data of game 1160 from 2004 TAC SCM competition.
4 Specification
The University of Macau team [3] has designed an agent
(called UMTac-04) and participated in the 2004 TAC SCM
competition.2 The UMTac-04 agent secured a 3rd position
2More details of this competition and its 29 entrants can be found at
http://www.sics.se/tac.
in the final competition. In the 2004 TAC SCM competi-
tion, the UMTac-04 team considers two common high-level
strategies which are used by some of the agents in the 2003
competition: buy-to-build and build-to-order [5]. In the
buy-to-build strategy, the agent acquires as many compo-
nents as possible and assembles them into PCs regardless
of the orders actually received from the customers. In the
build-to-order strategy, the agent first bids for the customer
orders. Based on the result of the bids, the agent will try
to acquire necessary components and assemble PCs for the
delivery.
In order to illustrate how negotiation with customers can
be specified with our forward-looking trading approach, we
have extracted records for day 56 from game 1160. Ac-
cording to the records of game 1160, customers issued 159
RFQs (for 1660 PCs) to each agent on day 56. In response
to the RFQs, the UMTac-04 agent has replied with 159 of-
fers within the same day. For the purpose of simplification,
we have extracted three RFQs for the calculation of offers.
These RFQs are given as follows:
1. RFQ1: 17 units of type-13 PC (IMD CPU 5.0 GHz,
1GB Mem, 300GB Hard Disk) for $33184 to be deliv-
ered on day 63 (customer’s reserve price: $2236 per
unit).
2. RFQ2: 17 units of type-7 PC (Pintel CPU 5.0 GHz,
2GB Mem, 300GB Hard Disk) for $38947 to be deliv-
ered on day 63 (customer’s reserve price: $2452 per
unit).
3. RFQ2: 3 units of type-6 PC (Pintel CPU 5.0 GHz, 1GB
Mem, 500GB Hard Disk) for $6531 to be delivered on
day 62 (customer’s reserve price: $2565 per unit).
As soon as RFQs have been received, the agent has to
decide on which RFQs to bid, and the value of the bids to
be sent for these RFQs. The UMTac-04 agent has adopted a
simple approach for the selection of RFQs. The UMTac-04
agent will send an offer for an RFQ only if it has sufficient
numbers of requested PCs in the inventory. This strategy
ensures that the agent will not bid beyond its capacity.
For the calculation of bids, the UMTac-04 agent has
used the probability prediction approach from the TacTex-
03 agent’s strategy [9]. Based on the statistics of the past
ten days provided by the game server, the TacTex-03 agent
calculates the lowest price, the average low price, the mid-
point between the average low and the average high price,
the average high price, the highest price, and the probabili-
ties of these offers being accepted. Based on this approach
the UMTac-04 agent calculates the five price values and re-
spective probabilities for the type-13 PC using the server
provided price report given in Table 1. The results of the
calculation are given in Table 2. According to the TAC
SCM game description, 4 to 7 cycles of simulated factory
Day HighPrice LowPrice Day HighPrice LowPrice
46 1976 1973 51 1969 1939
47 1970 1967 52 1970 1965
48 1974 1969 53 1968 1907
49 1975 1933 54 1962 1935
50 1969 1967 55 1960 1917
Table 1. Price report of type-13 PC during day
46 to 55 in Game 1160
Lowest Avg.Low Mid Avg.High Highest
Price 1907 1947.2 1958.25 1969.3 1976
Prob. 0.95 0.7 0.45 0.15 0.05
Table 2. Calculation of price prediction points
for type-13 PC at day 56
production time are required to assemble a PC. On average,
5.5 cycles are required for each type of PC. Each day, an
agent is endowed with 2000 cycles for production of PCs.
Therefore, the factory can produce approximately 370 PCs
each day.
Next, the probability of an offer for a specific type of PC
being accepted is calculated by dividing the total requested
units from all the RFQs by 370. For instance, according to
the records of game 1660, 190 type-13 PCs are requested
in day 56 by customers, and therefore, the probability of an
offer being accepted for that type of PC is 0.51. In a similar
way, the probabilities of type-7 (83 units) and type-6 PCs
(79 units) can be calculated. These probabilities are then
linearly interpolated with the probabilities from Table 2 to
determine the offer prices. According to the calculation the
offer prices of RFQ1, RFQ2, and RFQ3 are $1952 (proba-
bility 0.51), $2346 (probability 0.22), and $2283 (probabil-
ity 0.21).
Based on the actual cost of the components, the aver-
age cost for each type of PC can be derived. For the pur-
pose of our specification, we assume that for any type of
PC, the limit price is equal to the average cost of that PC.
Based on this assumption, the limit prices of type-13 PC
($1390.77) is calculated from the prices of IMD mother-
board ($168.70), IMD CPU 5.0 GHz ($939.71), 1 GB mem-
ory ($77.93), and 300GB hard disk ($204.43). In a similar
way, we can calculate the limit prices for type-7 ($1382.53)
and type-6 ($1357.91) PCs.
Based on the limit prices, the offers and the probabil-
ities of them being accepted, we can specify a composite
trading activity for negotiation with customers based on our
forward-looking trading approach. A composite trading ac-
tivity A for dealing with three RFQs is depicted in Figure 3.
In this scenario, the agent will negotiate for 17 type-13 PCs,
17 type-6 PCs, and 3 type-7 PCs with customers M1, M2,
and M3. The synchronisation construct [1..3] ensures that
at most 3 of the negotiations will be successful.
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2846.688 + 454.5892 + 884.9268 =
4186.185
Current time = 56
Sell 3 units of type-6
PC to Customer M3
Employing Alternating
Offer Bargaining Protocol
contingent(D,56,57)
turn(D) = 1
limit(D) =1357.91x3 =
4073.73
prob(2283x3,56) = 0.21
Sell 17 units of type-13
PC to Customer M1
Employing Alternating
Offer Bargaining Protocol
contingent(B,56,57)
turn(B) = 1
limit(B) =1390.77x17 =
23643.09
prob(1952x17,56) = 0.51
Sell 17 units of type-7
PC to Customer M2
Employing Alternating
Offer Bargaining Protocol
contingent(C,56,57)
turn(C) = 1
limit(C) =1382.53x17 =
23503.01
prob(2346x17,56) = 0.22
(A)
[1..3]
(B) (C) (D)
p7 = {{B,56,57},(C,56,57),(D,56,57)},
v1 = {B}, ev1 = {B,C,D},
v2 = {C}, ev2 = {B,C,D},
v3 = {D}, ev3 = {B,C,D},
v4 = {B,C}, ev4 = {B,C,D},
v5 = {B,D}, ev5 {B,C,D},
v6 = {C,D}, ev6 = {B,C,D},
v7 = {B,C,D}, ev7 = {B,C,D},
utility(p7) =
2998.3455 + 1394.87 + 222.74872 +
2297.4881 + 1028.869 + 433.61414 +
676.1156 = 9052.05
Derived properties based on
the maximum expected utility plan p7
contingent(A,56,56)
turn(A) = 57 - 56 = 1
prob(A) = 0.314262 + 0.09 + 0.080262 +
0.88638 + 0.083538 + 0.22638 + 0.023562
=  0.7
profit(A) = 12931.5
limit(A) = 4073.73
(A)
Figure 3. Plan generation and data propaga-
tion
ETA B in Figure 3 is employed to negotiate with cus-
tomer M1 using an alternating offer bargaining protocol.
The limit price for type-13 PC is $1390.77 per unit. At time
56, B can send an offer to M1 indicating that 17 units of
type-13 PCs can be sold at the price of $1952 per unit and
the expiry time of the offer is 1 day. Based on this offer,
we can derive that B is contingent from time 56 to 57 (cer-
tainty interval) since it is able to send a binding offer to M1
and the offer is greater than the limit price. B may send
the offer anytime on day 56 if it is instructed to do so. The
customer M1 must reply to the offer on day 57 as required
by the game and therefore the turnaround time is set to one
day. The probability of making a deal anytime during the
certainty interval is estimated to be 0.51. In a similar way,
we can define ETAs C and D as shown in Figure 3.
Based on the certainty property (and interval), limit
price, turnaround time, and probabilities of B, C, and
D, seven valid negotiation plans (p1 to p7) are gener-
ated for CTA A. For instance, according to plan p7 =
{(B, 56, 57), (C, 56, 57), (D, 56, 57)}, ETAs B, C, and D
will be instructed to send offers to the customers at time
56. There are seven possible valid outcomes of plan p7:
v1 = {B}, v2 = {C}, v3 = {D}, v4 = {B,C}, v5 =
{B,D}, v6 = {C,D}, and v7 = {B,C,D}. All these
outcomes have the same execution traces (i.e. {A,B,C})
since all ETAs are scheduled at the same time.
Based on the outcomes, execution traces, and the prob-
ability functions, the expected utility is calculated for each
plan. For CTA A, plan p7 has the highest expected utility.
Based on p7, the properties of A can be derived as follows:
• Since the number of secure trading activities in p7 is
less than the minimum number of child nodes required
to be successful (min(B) = 1), B is contingent. The
certainty interval of A is [56,56] since if p7 has to be
executed, it must be started on day 56.
• The turnaround time of A is one day since the execu-
tion of p7 starts at day 56 and finishes at day 57.
• There are seven valid outcomes for plan p7 (i.e. v1–
v7). The probability of A is the sum of the probabili-
ties of all outcomes of p7 .
• The profit of A is the utility of p7 divided by the prob-
ability of A (i.e. 12931.5).
• The limit price of A is the sum of the limit prices of
the child nodes within an outcome which is the mini-
mum among all available lower bound valid outcomes.
The lower bound valid outcomes of p7 are v1 = {B},
v2 = {C}, and v3 = {D}. The limit price of A is
40733.73 since limit(v3) is the minimum among the
three outcomes.
By using the cost of the components and the probability
estimations, the above example has shown that negotiation
plans can be generated for a CTA in the model. Every plan
generation at a CTA is followed by the derivation and prop-
agation of properties and the whole process may continue
upward until it reaches the root. The specification given in
Figure 3 can be extended to handle all RFQs received within
a day and CTAs for each day can be embedded within an-
other CTA so that a global negotiation plan can be generated
for the whole duration of the game.
Once a maximum expected utility plan is found at the
root, the agent may decide to execute the plan. In this case,
a negotiate instruction is issued to the root. When a CTA re-
ceives a negotiate instruction, it retrieves its own maximum
expected utility plan and executes it by using the execution
engine.
5 Related work
The TAC’s web site (http://tac.eecs.umich.edu) contains
information about the scenarios of the competition and links
to reports describing strategies employed by participants.
As mentioned earlier, an analysis of the strategies used in
the 2003 TAC SCM competition [5] shows that they can
be classified into two categories: buy-to-build and build-to-
order. The composite trading activities underlying both of
these broad strategies can be captured using our framework,
although for space reasons we have only shown how to cap-
ture the former.
Outside the TAC, the design of agents that participate in
interrelated trading activities has received significant atten-
tion. In particular, several approaches for bidding in mul-
tiple auctions have been proposed [4, 1]. Other work has
investigated the coordination of interrelated negotiation ac-
tivities to purchase an item from several potential sellers [8].
In these proposals, the emphasis is on negotiating with sev-
eral parties for identical or alternative items. In contrast, our
model supports the composition of trading activities linked
through both alternative (one-or-the-other) and complemen-
tary (all-or-nothing) relationships, as well as relationships
in-between these extremes. Also, our approach is generic:
It can be used to model a large spectrum of composite trad-
ing activities operating over various negotiation protocols.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how forward-looking framework can be
applied to specify composite trading activities from supply
chain management scenarios. We are currently investigat-
ing the possibility of incorporating forward looking trading
approach into future SCM agents.
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